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Challenging
Witness Competency
Michael M. Martin
Despite the modern trend
to hear all the evidence, a
surprising number of
witnesses can still be
challenged on competency
grounds.
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCEabolish all rules of incompetencyexcept those concerning judges or ju-
rors. When state law supplies the rule
of decision, however, state laws of in-
competency apply. This fact is signi-
EDITOR'S NoTE: This article is adapted from a chapter in the author's book,
BAsIc PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE (ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 6th ed. 1988).
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ficant principally in connection with
cases to which the Dead Man's Statute
of a state applies. See Fed. R. Evid.
601.
ENERAL RULE OF COMPEFENCY
* As minimum requirements of
competency, the judge must find:
9 That the proposed witness is capa-
ble of expressing himself concerning
the matter so as to be understood by
the judge and jury, either directly or
through interpretation by one who
can understand him;
* That the proposed witness is capa-
ble of understanding the duty of a
witness to tell the truth; and
* That there is evidence that the wit-
ness has personal knowledge of the
subject matter of his testimony, or ex-
perience, training, or education, if
that is required. This evidence may be
by the testimony of the witness him-
self.
Personal Knowledge
The personal knowledge require-
ment is codified in provisions such as
Fed. R. Evid. 602.
Under Fed. R. Evid. 602 the judge
may reject the testimony of a witness
that he perceived a matter if the judge
finds that no trier of fact could rea-
sonably believe that the witness did
perceive the matter. This power to re-
ject testimony expresses a proposition
of judicial notice. If no trier of fact
could reasonably believe the asser-
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tion, the court judicially knows that it
is untrue. Its untruth will be a matter
of common knowledge.
Oath or Affirmation
As a means of impressing on the
witness his obligation to tell what he
believes to be truth, Fed. R. Evid. 603
is typical in requiring an oath or affir-
mation. Likewise, an interpreter will
be required to acknowledge his obli-
gation to translate properly. See Fed.
R. Evid. 604.
A person having all the usual quali-
fications of pertinent knowledge and
ability to communicate may still not
be competent to testify. He may be
disqualified by:
* Connection with the tribunal;
* Mental derangement;
o Lack of oath capacity;
* Immaturity;
o Infamy;
" Interest; or
" Marital relationship to a party.
J uDGE • It is entirely clear that a
judge who is not sitting in the par-
ticular case is not incompetent to tes-
tify merely because he holds a judicial
office. He may have an excuse for
refusing or failing to obey a subpoena
ad testificandum at a specified time
and place because obedience would
interfere with his judicial duties, but
otherwise he is generally competent
and compellable. See United States v.
Frankenthal, 582 E2d 1102, 1107-08
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(7th Cir. 1978). There is some ques-
tion as to whether he may refuse to
testify to matters that came to his
knowledge in an earlier trial or pro-
ceeding over which he presided.
Traditionally, there was general
agreement that a judge may not tes-
tify to a material matter about which
there is a bona fide dispute in a trial
over which he is presiding and con-
tinues to preside as judge; but it was
not reversible error, if indeed it is tech-
nical error at all, for him to testify to a
formal matter that may be essential
but, when shown, cannot be dis-
puted. The modem trend is to make
the presiding judge incompetent to
testify even to formal matters, how-
ever. See Fed. R. Evid. 605. In this
connection it must be remembered
that if a trial judge has knowledge of
relevant facts falling outside the area
of judicial notice, he cannot properly
use it or make it known to the trier
except as a witness or by consent of
the parties.
J UROR * At common law a juror
was competent to testify as a wit-
ness at the trial and continue as a ju-
ror. If his testimony was material
upon a disputed matter, he could
hardly be called an unprejudiced trier
of the fact in dispute, but it was said
that his disqualification to sit as a ju-
ror should have been discovered be-
fore he was sworn. Fed. R. Evid. 602.
Fed. R. Evid. 606(a) and the modem
view are squarely opposed: jurors
may not testify.
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Impeachment of Verdict
The foregoing problem must be
sharply distinguished from that of the
competency of a juror to testify in im-
peachment of a verdict of the jury of
which he was a member. The cases
concerned with juror testimony to im-
peach a verdict fall into three classes:
@ Testimony concerning the juror's
mental operations, including the men-
tal and emotional effects that speci-
fied events or conditions had upon his
decision to join in the verdict;
*Testimony concerning objective
events or conditions in the jury room
during the jury's deliberations; and
* Testimony concerning objective
conduct of a juror outside the jury
room.
Testimony of the first class is al-
most universally rejected when of-
fered to impeach the verdict, but is re-
ceived in a number of jurisdictions to
support the verdict as against evi-
dence admissible and admitted to im-
peach it. Modern codifications, in-
cluding Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), reject it
in all cases.
The majority of courts still exclude
testimony of the second class. There is
a minority but growing contrary opin-
ion, often aided by statute, however.
As to testimony of the third class,
there is a sharp conflict of authority.
When testimony of a competent wit-
ness attacking a verdict for miscon-
duct of the jury is admitted, the testi-
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mony of jurors that the misconduct
did not occur is admissible. See Fed.
R. Evid. 606.
A TUO EY * An attorney is com-
petent to testify for or against
her client. If she is not the trial attor-
ney or a member of the same firm as
the trial attorney, there is no dissent
from this proposition. In a very few
jurisdictions she is said to be incompe-
tent as a witness for her client if she is
the trial attorney or actively assisting
at the trial, except when she could not
have foreseen that her testimony
would be needed. The overwhelming
weight of authority is to the contrary.
Although the attorney may be a com-
petent witness, in some circumstances
it is a violation of the profession's eth-
ical standards for the attorney to tes-
tify. See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 3.
M ENTAL DERANGEMENT a All the
early precedents to the contrary
notwithstanding, no modern court
holds that insanity totally disqualifies
a witness. If a person of unsound
mind has sufficient mental capacity to
remember and communicate what he
has perceived and to understand the
obligation to tell the truth under the
sanction that the local practice im-
poses, he is competent to testify. If his
mental derangement does not affect
the subject of his testimony, it does
not disqualify him, even though it
may seriously affect his credibility.
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Many state statutes that declare per-
sons of unsound mind incompetent as
witnesses are interpreted so as to har-
monize with the foregoing statements.
If a person has been adjudicated in-
sane or is confined in a mental institu-
tion, the party presenting him as a wit-
ness usually has the burden of proving
him to be competent. Otherwise, the
party objecting to a witness on the
ground of mental derangement has the
burden of proving the witness incom-
petent. Thus, the inmate of an asylum
may testify to what he observed con-
cerning an encounter between a guard
and another inmate, and a defendant's
conviction of having sexually assaulted
an insane woman may be largely based
upon the testimony of the woman.
State v. Herring, 268 Mo. 514, 535, 188
S.W. 169, 174 (1916); see United States
v. Peyro, 786 E2d 826, 830-31 (8th Cir.
1986); State v. Wildman, 145 Ohio St.
379, 386-88, 61 N.E.2d 790, 794
(1945).
At times the physical condition of a
person may be such as to make him
mentally incapable of understanding
any but very simple questions and thus
unable to undergo the cross-examina-
tion to which the opposing party is
normally entitled to subject him. If he
is able to communicate pertinent mat-
ter to the jury and to endure what the
judge believes to be an adequate cross-
examination concerning what he has
communicated, he should be held
competent, and the weight to be given
to his testimony should be for the trier
of fact to determine.
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O ATH CAPACITY * At commonlaw, no one was competent to
testify unless he believed that divine
punishment would follow false swear-
ing; some of the earlier cases required
belief that the punishment would be
inflicted after death, and no witness
would be heard until after he had
sworn that he would tell the truth.
The content of the oath was that
which conformed to the religion of
the witness. See the famous case Omi-
chund v. Barker, 26 Eng. Rep. 15 (Ch.
1744). Today in many states statutes
forbid or a constitutional provision is
construed as prohibiting the require-
ment of religious belief as a qualifica-
tion of a witness.
There are many modem cases in
which the competency of a child ap-
pears to be made to depend upon the
child's understanding of the meaning
of an oath and this, in turn, depends
upon the child's religious belief. The
recorded questions put to the child,
the answers before and after receiving
instruction, and the assumption that
the child has an appreciation of the
relation between his conduct and the
mandates of divinity, on their face,
approach the ridiculous. As a practi-
cal matter, however, such a proceed-
ing may serve to impress upon a child
the duty and importance of telling the
truth. The current attitude of the
courts is shown in the opinion in Hill
v. Skinner holding admissible the tes-
timony of a child of four years. "The
nature of his conception of the obliga-
tion to tell the truth is of little impor-
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tance if he shows that he will fulfill
the obligation to speak truthfully as a
duty which he owes to a deity or
something held in reverance or re-
gard, and if he has the intellectual
capacity to communicate his observa-
tions and experiences." 81 Ohio App.
375, 377, 79 N.E.2d 787, 789 (1947).
Occasionally, statutes provide for un-
sworn testimony by child witnesses
and others too mentally immature to
show they understand the obligation
to tell the truth. E.g., N.Y. Crim.
Proc. Law §60.20 (McKinney 1981).
Such statutes may be a practical ne-
cessity in prosecuting crimes such as
child abuse.
M ENTAL IMMATUfTY* As was
indicated above, the questions
of oath capacity of children and of
mental immaturity are usually inter-
mingled. The capacity of a child to
understand the obligation to tell the
truth may or may not be coexistent
with the capacity to remember and
narrate what he has experienced. This
dilemma is neatly illustrated in a Cali-
fornia case in which a trial judge was
reversed for permitting a child of four
years to testify when the judge had
not made or permitted an examina-
tion tending to show the child's
capacity to remember accurately.
Prior contradictory statements con-
cerning the crucial facts made by the
child to the committing magistrate at
the preliminary hearing of defendant
were also in evidence. People v. Dela-
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ney, 52 Cal. App. 765, 773-75, 199 P.
896, 900-01 (Dist. Ct. App. 1921).
The proponent may have the bur-
den of proving the competency of a
child under a given age; but the now
generally accepted view is as stated by
the Kentucky Court of Appeals:
"There is no unalterable rule measur-
ing the competency of a witness be-
cause of his age, and the court should
make inquiry into the child's qualifi-
cations and determine whether he is
sufficiently intelligent to observe, rec-
ollect and narrate the facts, and has a
sense of obligation to speak the truth.
If so, then the child should be allowed
to testify, and it is for the jury to deter-
mine what weight to give his testi-
mony, once the court rules he is a
competent witness." Jackson v. Com-
monwealth, 301 Ky. 562, 565, 192
S.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1946).
TNFAMY During the seventeenth
century it became settled that con-
viction of treason, felony, or crimen
falsi rendered the convict incompe-
tent as a witness. It seems clear that
crimen falsi included offenses that in-
volved fraud or deceit or that injuri-
ously affected-the administration of
justice. Whatever may have been the
reason for creating the incompetency,
it was later sought to be justified on
the theory that the criminal conduct
indicated such moral depravity as to
make the convict utterly unworthy of
belief and that the judgment of con-
viction was conclusive evidence of
guilt, rather than that the incompe-
JANUAR Y
tency was imposed as a part of the
punishment. This theory, however,
obviously cannot explain the tradi-
tionally accepted rules:
* That a judgment of conviction by a
court of another jurisdiction does not
disqualify;
* That serving the imposed sentence
restores competency;
9 That a pardon, though not granted
because of the supposed innocence of
the convict, does likewise; and
0 That a verdict of guilty or even a
plea of guilty unless and until fol-
lowed by a judgment of conviction
does not create incompetency.
These rules seem to point to the pu-
nitive theory, but it is difficult to see
why a litigant who needs a convict's
testimony should suffer for the con-
vict's offenses. The irrationality of the
common law doctrine has led to its
abolition by statute in most states.
As a matter of federal constitu-
tional law, a defendant in a criminal
case could not be disqualified from
testifying in his own behalf-or of
having a witness testify for him-
without violating his right of due
process. Washington v. Texas, 388
U.S. 14,22 (1967). Similarly, it can be
argued that a party to a civil case may
be denied critical evidence in his be-
half as a result of a state rule of in-
competency based upon a conviction.
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NTEREST e At common law, aparty to an action was incompetent
to testify in his own favor and had a
privilege not to testify against himself.
In equity, the sworn answer of the de-
fendant was treated as evidence inso-
far as it was strictly responsive to the
bill and could not be overcome by the
testimony of a single witness. The
plaintiff had called for the answer un-
der oath and could not object to its
use. A party in equity, by use of a bill
of discovery, could also get informa-
tion on facts essential to his own case
that were within the knowledge of his
opponent, but could not secure dis-
closure of the opponent's case.
In criminal cases, defendants were
incompetent as witnesses both in En-
gland and in this country. It was not
until 1898 that defendants became
competent in England, and they were
incompetent in a few states until re-
cently. In all states, defendants are
now competent to testify, but are not
compellable.
A co-indictee would under com-
mon law normally be a party and, as
such, incompetent to testify on behalf
of either the prosecution or the de-
fense. If he ceased to be a party by
termination of the prosecution as
against him, however, he became
competent, at least for the prosecu-
tion. If a co-indictee were to be tried
separately, he was by the English cases
held competent to testify for the pros-
ecution or the defense; but in the
United States the greater number of
courts held him incompetent to testify
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for the defense. At present, as a result
of statutes or case law, a co-indictee is
everywhere deemed competent to tes-
tify either for or against his fellow co-
indictee, and it is immaterial whether
they are tried together or separately.
A person other than a party was dis-
qualified as a witness if he had such an
immediate legal interest in the action
or suit that he would gain or lose by the
direct legal effect of the judgment or
decree or ifit could be used as evidence
against him. The extent of the interest
was immaterial. If he would be liable
for costs in the event of an adverse de-
cision, he would be incompetent. On
the other hand, he was perfectly com-
petent though he mistakenly believed
that he had a direct legal interest or
considered himself morally bound to
pay any adverse judgment or was vi-
tally interested in having the issue de-
termined in a specified way because
such a decision would be highly bene-
ficial to him in pending and future
business ventures.
Legislation
The slow process by which the com-
mon law evolved by judicial decision
could not adapt the rules of evidence
associated with that law to conditions
in modem society with its mass of liti-
gation growing out of commerce. Leg-
islation was imperative. Consequently,
disqualification of a witness, whether
or not a party, because of interest has
been almost entirely abolished both in
England and in this country. See Fed.
R. Evid. 601.
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So-called Dead Man's Statutes
In a significant number of states,
statutes exist that disqualify either the
opposing party or the opposing party
and any other interested person as a
witness in any action against the estate
of a deceased person or against a rep-
resentative of an incompetent person.
The terms of the statutes vary so
widely that is is impossible to make
any valid generalization concerning
the scope of their operation. The judi-
cial decisions interpreting these stat-
utes also reveal that policy perspec-
tives and attitudes toward these
statutes vary widely from state to
state. See, e.g., Wolff v. First Nat'l
Bank, 47 Ariz. 97, 106-07, 53 P.2d
1077, 1081 (1936); Cocker v. Cocker,
215 Minn. 565, 570, 10 N.W.2d 734,
737 (1934). The cases are in conflict as
to whether the marital relation in it-
self makes the spouse of the interested
party incompetent. See Annot., 27
A.L.R.2d 538 (1953). The Illinois Su-
preme Court has taken what is proba-
bly the most extreme position in sup-
port of this principle, holding the
divorced wife of an interested survi-
vor incompetent to testify concerning
any transaction between the decedent
and the survivor that occurred while
the marriage existed. Heineman v.
Hermann, 3851Ill. 191, 52 N.E.2d 263
(1944); Hann v. Brooks, 331 Ill. App.
535, 73 N.E.2d 624 (1947).
In contrast, Wigmore and most
other commentators have condemned
such statutes. The Commonwealth
Fund Committee, The American Law
JANUAR Y
Institute, the American Bar Associa-
tion, the Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, and the Advisory Com-
mittee on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence also have recommended their
abolition, but legislatures and lawyers
have until very recently paid little
heed. Consequently, the practitioner
must consult the local statute and the
numerous decisions interpreting its
terms. Particular attention must be
paid to the provisions concerning:
" The persons disqualified;
" The subject matter to which the dis-
qualification applies; and
* The conditions upon the happening
of which the disqualification may be
or become inapplicable or be waived.
Some statutes, like that of New York,
are fertile breeders of litigation, and
most of them, while preventing the
enforcement of many honest claims,
are ineffective to prevent perjury by
witnesses whose interest does not fall
within the statutory ban.
M ARITAL RELATIONSHIP a At
common law, neither spouse
was competent to testify for the other.
This rule was applied in criminal cases
in the federal courts until 1933. Then
the United States Supreme Court de-
clared it so completely out of har-
mony with contemporary judicial and
legislative thought that it must be
abandoned, even though Congress
had not seen fit to change it. Funk v.
United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-82
HeinOnline  -- 1 Prac. Litig. 42 1990
1990
(1933). Today one spouse is compe-
tent as a witness on behalf of the other
in both civil and criminal cases. The
pertinent statutes vary in details.
Common Law Exceptions
The common law made some ex-
ceptions to the disqualification when
its application would create intolerable
injustice and the desired marital har-
mony had already been badly dam-
aged, if not totally destroyed. When
the action involved intended injury to
the person of one spouse by the act of
the other, the injured spouse was
deemed competent. (In all the early
cases theinjured wife was the witness.)
How much further the common law
extended the exception is not at all
clear, but modem statutes have made it
applicable to crimes against the person
or property of the witness-spouse, in-
cluding assault, bigamy, adultery, and
desertion. Furthermore, in many states
husband and wife are by statute made
competent witnesses either for or
against each other; in others, the com-
mon law disqualification has been
transformed into a privilege of the wit-
ness. Except in prosecutions for crimes
against the person or property of the
spouse, however, one spouse is still
generally incompetent to testify
against the other in a criminal case. See
generally Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40, 48-50 & n.9 (1980); 2
Wigmore §488; 8 id. §2245.
In the federal courts, if state law
provides the rule of decision, a spouse-
witness' incompetency (or, put in
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In a sham, phony, empty
ceremony such as the parties
went through in this case,
the reason for the rule
disqualifying a spouse from
giving testimony disappears.
Wigmore's terms, a privilege that a
spouse-witness not testify) is governed
by that state's law. When federal law
provides the rule of decision, spousal
incompetency is treated as a privilege
under Rule 501 to be governed, in the
absence of a governing statute or con-
stitutional rule, "by the principles of
the common law as they may be inter-
preted... in the light or reason and
experience." The Supreme Court's ten-
dency has been to interpret the spousal
incompetency-privilege narrowly. In
Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525
(1960), the Court extended the com-
mon law exception, covering situations
in which injury to the person of the
wife was the offense charged, to a
prosecution under the Mann Act. The
wife was the "victim," but not necessar-
ily an unwilling victim.
Spurious Marriages
In Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604, 615 (1953), the Court had to
deal with the competency of "so-
called wives" of "spurious marriages"
to testify against and incriminate their
purported husbands in the criminal
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The disqualification or
privilege is usually limited to
actions in which the spouse
is a party.
prosecution. The marriage ceremo-
nies in Lutwak had been performed
solely to enable one of the spouses in
each instance to qualify for entrance
into the United States under the War
Brides Act, with the understanding
that the marriage would not be con-
summated by cohabitation and would
be followed by divorce. The majority
of the Court said: "In a sham, phony,
empty ceremony such as the parties
went through in this case, the reason
for the rule disqualifying a spouse
from giving testimony disappears,
and with it the rule."
PrivMege of Spouse- Witness
More recently, the Court decided in
rammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40
(1980), that the incompetency is a
privilege to be claimed by only the
spouse-witness, not by either spouse,
as had apparently been the federal
law previously. Wyatt v. United
States, 362 U.S. 525, at 528-29 (1960).
Because the prosecutor has substan-
tial power to induce a spouse-witness
to testify, Trammel makes it more
likely that the government will get the
benefits of spousal testimony. See
generally Lempert, A Right to Every
Woman's Evidence, 66 Iowa L. Rev.
JANUARY
725 (1981). It should be noted, how-
ever, that the Court in Trammel reaf-
firmed the common law privilege for
spousal confidential communica-
tions.
Whether the exclusion of the
spouse is because of incompetency or
privilege, it is important to bear in
mind the following propositions:
* The relation must be that of legal
wedlock. The rule has no application
to participants in a bigamous or oth-
erwise void marriage or illicit cohabi-
tation.
* The disqualification or privilege is
usually limited to actions in which the
spouse is a party. When two or more
persons are charged with the same
crime and are tried together, the
spouse of one defendant may not tes-
tify against another defendant, but
the same spouse may testify if the
other defendant is separately tried.
There are a number of decisions,
however, which hold one spouse in-
competent to testify in any action to
matters that will incriminate the other
spouse; some go as far as to disqualify
the witness-spouse if the testimony
will merely disgrace the other spouse.
See, e.g., Grand Jury Subpoena of
Ford v. United States, 756 F2d 249 (2d
Cir. 1985); In re Grand Jury Matter,
673 E2d 688 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1015 (1982).
The disqualification or privilege ex-
ists from the inception to the termina-
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tion of the marriage and should ter-
minate with death or divorce.
* It is immaterial that the marriage
was effected for the purpose of mak-
ing the spouse unable to testify over
objection.
* Wigmore seemed to be of the opin-
ion that the exclusion covers extraju-
dicial assertions by the spouse, but in
practically all the reported cases the
excluded evidence clearly was inad-
missible hearsay. Only in cases involv-
ing bills of discovery was the disquali-
fication or privilege of any impor-
tance. Most courts hold that the
disqualification or privilege does not
operate to exclude the evidence when
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the declarant spouse's statement is
found to have been adopted by the
party-spouse by his silence or acquies-
cence or when it is a vicarious admis-
sion through an agent or a predeces-
sor in interest.
* The majority of the decisions seem
to hold that an inference can be
drawn against a party for failure to
call his spouse as a witness. The better
view, however, seems to be that of
Rule 512 of the 1974 Uniform Rules
of Evidence, which bars comment on
or inference from an exercise of the
privilege and indicates that proceed-
ings should be conducted so as to fa-
cilitate the making of privilege claims
without the jury's knowledge.
The rules of privilege variously permit a person to refuse to be a
witness, disclose a communication or matter, or produce an object or
writing, or to prevent another from doing so. They are unlike most of
the other rules excluding evidence, which reflect considerations intrin-
sic to the judicial process, such as probative value, reliability, prejudi-
cial effect, and possible confusion of the trier. The privileges which are
addressed by these rules are largely concerned with social policies ex-
trinsic to the accurate and efficient resolution of controversies.
The dominant concept by which privileges have been analyzed
through most of this century has been Wigmore's. Often described as
an "instrumental" or "utilitarian" approach, it calls for weighing the
benefits of preventing disclosure against the value to accurate adjudi-
cation of having all relevant information before the trier.
M. MARTIN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 147-48
(ALI-ABA, Philadelphia, 6th ed. 1988)
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